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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On July I ,  2006, a man was allegedly beaten and robbed while showing an 
apartment to two other men. Four suspects were charged in the case-the alleged 
mastermind, the two alleged assailants, and, Sheldon Stone, the alleged driver. 
Ultimately, one of those four, the alleged mastermind, "rolled" on his co-defendants and 
took a plea deal that garnered him a "rider." 
Based on the statements of the alleged mastermind, Mr. Stone was charged with 
three felonies: (1) criminal conspiracy; (2) aiding and abetting battery with intent to 
commit a serious felony (robbery); and (3) aiding and abetting robbery. At Mr. Stone's 
trial, the State's key witness was the alleged mastermind, who not only placed 
Mr. Stone at the scene of the formation of the alleged conspiracy, but also testified that 
Mr. Stone overheard the planning of the alleged attack and drove the other two 
assailants to the scene of that alleged attack. Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Stone guilty 
of all charges, and the district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of twelve 
years, with three years (although it retained jurisdiction over Mr. Stone). 
Mr. Stone now appeals. On appeal, he contends that all three of his convictions 
should be vacated because the accomplice testimony used to convict him (that of the 
alleged mastermind) was not corroborated by any other evidence tending to connect 
him to the alleged crimes, as is required under I.C. § 19-21 17. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs 
During the spring of 2006, Jeremy Sanderson, a convicted felon, and his 
girlfriend, rented an apartment in Blackfoot, Idaho from a gentleman named Douglas 
Griffith. (Tr., p.76, Ls.4-6, p.142, Ls.8-25.) In June of 2006, after just a few weeks or 
months in the apartment, Mr. Sanderson and his girlfriend moved out. (Tr., p.76, Ls.7- 
12.) For reasons that are irrelevant to this appeal, Mr. Griffith was not immediately 
forthcoming with the return of Mr. Sanderson's security deposit, and this fact upset 
Mr. Sanderson. (See Tr., p.77, L.7 - p.79, L.22, p.143, Ls.1-17.) 
On July 1, 2008, Mr. Sanderson had at least one heated telephone conversation 
with Mr. Griffith. (See Tr., p.77, L.7 - p.79, L.22, p.143, Ls.4-17.) After hanging up with 
Mr. Griffith, Mr. Sanderson immediately called his best friend from prison, Dustin Bailey; 
he claims that he asked Mr. Bailey to come to Blackfoot from American Falls to beat up 
Mr. Griffith. (Tr., p.143, L.25 - p.144, L.16.) 
According to Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey arrived in Blackfoot later that evening 
.- -- - - -- - - - 
with three other people-his stepbrother, Tyler Wall, Mr. Wall's friend, Sheldon Stone, 
and an unidentified female. (Tr., p.145, L.13 - p.146, L.25.) Mr. Sanderson claims that 
he, Mr. Bailey, and Mr. Wall stood around Mr. Bailey's car as Mr. Sanderson and 
Mr. Bailey discussed the nature of the dispute between Mr. Sanderson and Mr. Griftith 
and planned to attack Mr. Griffith.' (Tr., p.148, L.8 - p.150, L.17.) Although Mr. Stone 
was allegedly sitting on some stairs approximately ten feet away (Tr., p.151, Ls.18-19, 
p.152, Ls.2-4), Mr. Sanderson repeatedly opined that Mr. Stone heard what 
Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey; and Mr. Wall were talking about. (See, e.g., Tr., p.152, Ls.5- 
10 (testifying that "everyone," including Mr. Stone, had their "attention towards" the 
conversation), p.175, Ls.4-17 (testifying that "[ilt appeared he [Mr. Stone] was listening" 
to the conversation), p.179, Ls.2-12 (testifying that it "appeared" that "everyone" was 
listening to the conversation), p.224, Ls.3-22 (testifying that Mr. Stone "look very 
interested in" the conversation and "seem[ed] to be paying attention" to it, and that his 
face was turned toward the speakers), p.232, L.23 - p.233, L.2 (testifying that it was his 
"opinion" that Mr. Stone was "right in hearing distance"). Cf. Tr., p.208, Ls.3-5 
(admitting that he could not know for sure what, if anything, Mr. Stone overheard), 
p.225, L.13 - p.226, L.4, p.239, Ls.3-21 (testifying that Mr. Stone appeared to want to 
be involved in the conversation because he repeatedly approached the other three men, 
but the three men stopped talking every time Mr. Stone approached).) However, this 
opinion was questioned by Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, both of whom believed that there 
was no way Mr. Stone could have overheard their conversation. (Tr., p.279, Ls.10-13, 
p.310, Ls.13-16.) 
Following the conversation at the car, Mr. Bailey, Mr. Wall, and Mr. Stone 
allegedly left (in Mr. Bailey's car) to go meet Mr. Griffith. (Tr., p.152, L.24 - p.153, L.5, 
p.153, L.25 - p.154, L.1.) According to Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey instructed Mr. Stone 
to drive. (Tr., p.153, Ls.11-14.) However, according to Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, 
Mr. Bailey drove. (Tr., p.279, Ls.7-9, p.310, Ls.7-12.) 
There is no dispute that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall met up with Mr. Griffith under the 
guise of searching for an apartment. (Tr., p.81, Ls.2-13, p.85, Ls.10-19, p.87, Ls.3-5, 
According to Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, however, no attack was ever pre-planned; the 
men simply intended to talk to Mr. Griffith about the situation with Mr. Sanderson's 
sec~~ritv denonit ITr n 773 l s 11-22 n 298 Ls 2-14.) 
p.267, L.15 - p.270, L.24, p.305, Ls.2-8.) Nor is there any dispute that, while Mr. Griffith 
was showing them an apartment, a physical altercation erupted. (Tr., p.282, L.12 - 
p.284, L.17, p.306, L.11 - p.308, L.13.) There is, however, conflicting evidence as to 
who started the fight. Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall testified that Mr. Griffith attacked them 
(Tr., p.283, L.21 - p.284, L.4, p.308, ~s.5-13),' while Mr. Griffith testified that he was 
"suckerpunched" and then beaten by Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall (Tr., p.90, L.8 - p.93, L.2). 
Regardless, in the end, Mr. Griffith was the one who was injured. (Tr., p.133, Ls.3-4.) 
In addition, he claims that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall took approximately $1200 from his 
pocket before leaving. (Tr., p.92, L.25 - p.93, L.7, p.95, Ls.2-21.) 
According to Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey, Mr. Watt, and Mr. Stone returned to his 
trailer approximately 20 minutes after they left. (Tr., p.154, Ls.4-5.) Mr. Sanderson 
claims that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall (but not Mr. Stone) were covered in blood, and that 
all three men were "excited" or "hyped up." (Tr., p.154, Ls.8-25.) He testified that 
Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall discussed what had happened to Mr. Griffith, and that they 
produced $1200, which ended up being split among the four men. (Tr., p.155, L . l l  - 
p.157, L.3, p.158, L . l l  -p.159, L.4.) 
Months later, on November 29, 2006, the State charged Mr. Stone with three 
felonies related to the events of July 1, 2006: (1) conspiracy to commit robbery andlor 
battery with the intent to commit a serious felony (robbery); (2) aiding and abetting 
Although Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall testified at Mr. Stone's trial that they acted in self- 
defense and, further, individually denied taking anything from Mr. Griffith (p.284, Ls.18- 
21, p.306, Ls.5-lo), it is notable that they had both previously pled guilty to robbery 
based on their actions on July 1, 2006. (Tr., p.260, Ls.14-21, p.290, Ls.3-15.) The 
record does not reveal whether their guilty pleas were given pursuant to North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). or whether they were supported by actual admissions of 
ns tilt 
battery with the intent to commit a serious felony (robbery); and (3) aiding and abetting 
robbery. (R., pp.6-8.) Following a preliminary hearing, Mr. Stone was bound over to the 
district court on all three counts. (R., pp.13-I5 (preliminary hearing minutes), 18-20 
(commitment order).) On December 22, 2006, the State filed its Information. (R., 
Mr. Stone exercised his right to a jury trial, and that trial, which lasted two days, 
began on May 30, 2007. (See generally R., pp.166-72; Tr., pp.1-437.) During the trial, 
the State presented testimony from three witnesses-Mr. Griffith, the alleged victim, 
Jeremy Sanderson, the alleged ringleader who turned State's evidence in an effort to 
save himself, and Detective Rocky Cronquist, the police officer who interrogated 
Mr. Stone briefly (until Mr. Stone invoked his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights3). (See 
Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.254, L.lO.) Mr. Griffith testified that he had a disagreement with 
Mr. Sanderson on the telephone; later that day, Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall met him at his 
apartment complex claiming to be looking for an apartment; and while showing 
Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall an apartment, the two men jumped him, beating him severely 
and taking his money. (See Tr., p.74, L.9 - p.139, L.12.) 
Mr. Sanderson, who could fairly be characterized as the State's key witness in 
this case, testified that, after having a disagreement with Mr.Griffith, he called his best 
friend at the time, Dustin Bailey, and asked for Mr. Bailey's help with his situation with 
his landlord. (Tr., p.143, L.25 - p.144, L.16.) He testified that Mr. Bailey showed up 
See Police Reports, p.338 ("Stone then requested an attorney and was turned back to 
jail.). (Many of the police reports were appended to the PSI by the presentence 
investigator. Because each page in the appended reports appears to bear a unique 
handwritten page number on its lower right hand corner, citations to the police reports 
include references to those oaae numbers.) 
with Mr. Wall, Mr. Stone, and an unidentified female and that, while he asked only 
Mr. Bailey to beat and rob Mr. Griffith, Mr. Wall and Mr. Stone were positioned to 
overhear the conversation. (Tr., p.145, L.13 - p.146, L.25, p.148, L.8 - p.150, L.17, 
p.151, Ls.18-19, p.152, Ls.2-4, p.152, Ls.5-10, p.175, Ls.4-17, p.179, Ls.2-12, p.224, 
Ls.3-22, p.232, L.23 - p.233, L.2.) He claimed that the three men then left, with 
Mr. Stone driving Mr. Bailey's car, only to return a short while later, some (Mr. Bailey 
and Mr. Wall) covered in blood, and in the possession of approximately $1200. (Tr., 
p.154, Ls.4-25, p.155, L . l l  -p.157, L.3, p.158, L.11 -p.l59, L.4.) 
Finally, the State offered the testimony of Detective Cronquist, who had 
interrogated Mr. Stone following his arrest. (See Tr., p.244, L.9 - p.254, L.7.) On direct 
examination, Detective Cronquist testified that, during the interrogation, Mr. Stone told 
him that his knowledge of the incident with Mr. Griffith was limited to what he had seen 
on television (Tr., p.247, L.24 - p.248, L.2, p.248, L.24 - p.249, L.l), and that the only 
thing he knew was that "a guy owed somebody some money, and that's what the whole 
thing was about" (Tr., p.249, Ls.12-14). In addition, Det. Cronquist testified on direct 
that, when confronted about his own whereabouts on July I, 2006, Mr. Stone denied 
that he had been in Blackfoot. (Tr., p.248, Ls.24-25.) On cross-examination, Det. 
Cronquist conceded that the incident with Mr. Griffith had been "all over the news." (Tr., 
p.251, Ls.16-18.) At defense counsel's suggestion, he also revealed for the first time 
that, during his interrogation, Mr. Stone had changed his story and had, in fact, been in 
Blackfoot on July I, 2006. (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-18.) 
Ultimately, the jury found Mr. Stone guilty of all three charged offenses. (R., 
pp.174-75; Tr., p.431, L.15 - p.432, L.7.) 
Fourteen days after the jury rendered its verdicts, on June 14, 2007, Mr. Stone 
filed a timely motion for an acquittal pursuant to I.C.R. 29(c). (R., p.179.) That motion 
was based on I.C. 9 19-2117, which states as follows: "A conviction cannot be had on 
the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in 
itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it 
merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof." Thus, 
Mr. Stone's argument was that acquittals should be entered because Mr. Sanderson's 
"accomplice" testimony-the only testimony connecting Mr. Stone to the alleged attack 
on Mr. Griffith-was not corroborated by any other independent evidence. (R., p.179.) 
On July 9, 2007, while Mr. Stone's motion for an acquittal was still pending, the 
district court proceeded with his sentencing hearing. (See generally R., pp.184-85; 
Supp. Tr., pp.1-42.) At the conclusion of that hearing, the district court imposed three 
concurrent unified sentences of twelve years, with three years; however, the district 
court also retained jurisdiction over Mr. Stone. (R., pp.184-85, 187-88; Supp. Tr., p.37, 
L.9 - p.38, L.15.) Later the same day, the district court filed its JudgmenVOrder of 
Retained Jurisdiction. (R., pp.187-89.) 
On January 8, 2008, following his successful "rider," the district court suspended 
Mr. Stone's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of five years. (R., 
pp.197-99; Tr., p.473, Ls.13-15.) The district court entered a written order to that effect 
later the same day. (R., pp.197-99.) 
On June 13, 2008, the district court finally ruled upon Mr. Stone's motion for an 
acquittal. (R., pp.223-30.) Initially, it noted that "[tlhe State's evidence linking Stone to 
the battery upon and robbery of Griffith is certainly tenuous"; however, it further held 
that "[allthough the corroborating evidence is threadbare, . . . the inferences therefrom 
tend to connect Stone to the crime." (R., p.229.) The district court found two aspects of 
Detective Cronquist's testimony (about Mr. Stone's interrogation) dispositive: first, 
Mr. Stone identified Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall by name, without first being told their 
names by Detective ~ r o n ~ u i s t , ~  and also knew that the alleged crime had something to 
do with someone owing someone else some money; second, while Mr. Stone initially 
told Detective Cronquist that he had not been in Blackfoot on July 1, 2006, the day of 
Mr. Griffith's altercation with Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall, he later changed his story, 
admitting that he had, in fact, been in Blackfoot that day.5 (R., pp.229-30) 
On July 11, 2008, Mr. Stone filed a Notice of Appeal which was timely not only 
from the district court's order denying his motion for an acquittal, but also the district 
court's judgment of con~iction.~ (R., pp.233-34.) On appeal, Mr. Stone contends that 
The district court reasoned that a "casual observer of a news story" would be unlikely 
to recall the names of the suspects who were the subject of that news story five months 
after the news story first aired and, therefore, Mr. Stone's knowledge of the names of 
the suspects tended to implicate him in the crime. (R., pp.229-30.) 
The district court reasoned that Mr. "Stone's sudden change in recollection, when 
Cronquist told Stone that he could receive more favorable treatment like the cooperating 
individual if Stone would cooperate with the police, is at odds with someone who had 
absolutely no connection, other than as a recipient of a news story, to a criminal act." 
$R., p.230.) 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) provides that the 42-day time limit for filing a notice of 
appeal in a criminal case "is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen (14) 
days of the entry of judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or 
sentence in the action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence 
commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such 
motion." Obviously, a motion for an acquittal under I.C.R. 29(c) is a motion which, if 
granted, will affect the judgment and sentence in a case. Thus, Mr. Stone's 42-day time 
limit for appealing from the judgment of conviction in this case began to run anew on 
June 13, 2008, the date on which the district court denied his timely motion for an 
arm tittal 
all three of his convictions should be vacated because the accomplice testimony used to 
convict him was not corroborated by any other evidence tending to connect him to the 
alleged crimes. 
ISSUE 
Can Mr. Stone's convictions stand where the accomplice testimony upon which they are 
based was not corroborated by any other evidence tending to connect Mr. Stone to the 
charged offenses? 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Stone's Convictions Cannot Stand Because The Accomplice Testimonv Upon 
Which They Were Based Was Not Corroborated BV Anv Other Evidence Tendina To 
Connect Mr. Stone To The Charaed Offenses 
A. Introduction 
ldaho law provides that a criminal defendant cannot be convicted based solely on 
the testimony of an alleged accomplice; in order for the conviction to stand, the 
accomplice testimony must be corroborated by some independent evidence tending to 
connect the defendant to the alleged crime(s). I.C. § 19-2117. In this case, Mr. Stone 
contends that there is insufficient evidence to uphold his convictions because the State 
offered no evidence tending to connect him with his alleged crimes, other than the 
testimony of Jeremy Sanderson, one of his alleged accomplices. Thus, he respectfully 
requests that this Court vacate his convictions. 
B. Applicable Leqal Standards 
In order to "protect against the danger that an accomplice may wholly fabricate 
testimony, incriminating an innocent defendant in order to win more favorable treatment 
for the accomplice," Matthews v. State, 136 ldaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 
2001), ldaho law holds that accomplice testimony alone cannot support a conviction in a 
criminal case, and that, in order to obtain a conviction, the State must offer some 
independent corroboration of the accomplice's testimony. Specifically, ldaho law 
provides as follows: 
A conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he 
- - h h a  i n  ~nrhirh in itcelf and withnc~t the aid of 
the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it 
merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances 
thereof. 
It is well-established that the corroborating evidence required by section 19-2117 
need not "be sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every 
detail of the accomplice's testimony. Corroborating evidence may be slight, need only 
go to one material fact, and may be entirely circumstantial. Statements attributed to the 
defendant himself may serve as the necessary corroboration." State v. Mitchell, 146 
ldaho 378, 382-83, 195 P.3d 737, 741-42 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). In 
addition, an innocent explanation of the evidence in question, even if highly plausible, 
"does not strip the evidence of its corroborative character." State v. Hill, 140 625, 630, 
97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant-appellant argues that there was insufficient corroboration of 
the alleged accomplice's testimony, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
against used to convict him. See State v. Hill, 140 625, 629, 97 P.3d 1014, 1018 (Ct. 
App. 2004); State v. Pierce, 107 ldaho 96, 100, 685 P.2d 837, 841 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Thus, in this case, Mr. Stone's claim regarding the lack of evidence to corroborate the 
alleged accomplice's testimony is really a claim that there is insufficient evidence to 
support any of his three convictions. 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal 
where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Sfafe v. Mitchell, 146 ldaho 378, 382, 195 P.3d 
737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008). Accordingly, an appellate court will not substitute its own 
view for "that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to 
the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Id. In 
addition, the appellate court "will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution." Id. 
The exact same standard applies where the defendant-appellant contends that 
the district court erred in denying his motion for an acquittal under ldaho Criminal Rule 
Upon review of the denial of such a motion, [the appellate] Court must 
determine whether there was substantial and competent evidence to 
support the verdict. [It] must independently consider the evidence to 
determine whether a reasonable mind could conclude that the defendant's 
guilt had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt on each essential 
element of the crime. In so doing, [the appellate] Court will construe all of 
the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict and will not substitute its 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to 
be given to the testimony, or the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence. 
Sfafe v. Hill, 140 625, 629, 97 P.3d 1014, 1018 (Ct. App. 2004) (citations omitted). 
D. The Accom~lice Testimony Used To Convict Mr. Stone Was Not Corroborated 
Bv Any Other Evidence Tendins To Connect Mr. Stone To The Alleqed Crimes 
Just as he argued below (in support of his motion for an acquittal), Mr. Stone 
asserts now on appeal that the evidence used to convict him-the testimony of 
Mr. Sanderson, his alleged accomplice-was not corroborated by any other evidence 
tending to connect him to the alleged offenses against Mr. Griffith and, therefore, 
Mr. Stone's convictions cannot stand under I.C. § 19-21 17. He asserts that, although 
the district court found that the evidence linking him to the alleged offenses against 
Mr. GrifTith was "certainly tenuous," and, thus, the evidence corroborating 
Mr. Sanderson's testimony was "threadbare" (R., p.229), even that description of the 
state of the evidence is far too generous and, in fact, there is no evidence, independent 
of Mr. Sanderson's testimony, tending to connect Mr. Stone to the alleged offenses 
against Mr. Griffith. 
As discussed above, at Mr. Stone's trial, only five witnesses testified- 
Mr. Sanderson, Mr. Bailey, Mr. Wall, Mr. Griffith, and Detective Cronquist. (See 
generally Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.334, L.17.) Mr. Sanderson, an alleged accomplice of 
Mr. Stone, was the one who implicated Mr. Stone, so the question is whether his 
testimony was ever corroborated by any of the other witnesses. See I.C. (j 19-2117. 
Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall were both alleged to have been accomplices so, even if they 
had implicated Mr. Stone (which they did not), their testimony could not be used to 
corroborate Mr. Sanderson's story. I.C. (j 19-2117. In addition, although Mr. Griffith's 
testimony supported the State's contention that a crime had been committed (see Tr., 
p.74, L.9 - p.139, L.l I ) ,  this fact did not corroborate Mr. Sanderson's story because it 
did not tend to connect Mr. Stone to that alleged offense. I.C. (j 19-21 17. 
Given the foregoing, there was only one witness who could have possibly 
connected Mr. Stone to the alleged offenses against Mr. Griffith-Detective Cronquist. 
As noted, Detective Cronquist briefly interrogated Mr. Stone (before Mr. Stone invoked 
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights) and obtained statements to the following effect: 
(1) Mr. Stone knew that Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall were alleged to have been involved in 
the same offenses with which he was charged (Tr., p.250, L.21 - p.251, L.1); 
(2) Mr. Stone knew that the alleged offenses had something to do with someone owing 
someone else some money (Tr., p.249, Ls.12-14); and (3) Mr. Stone was in Blackfoot 
on July 1, 2006, the date of the alleged offenses (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-18). In addition, 
Detective Cronquist testified that Mr. Stone had initially denied having been in Blackfoot 
on the date in question, but then changed his story in response to an implied promise of 
leniency. (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-18.) These are the statements that the district court found 
were sufficiently corroborative of Mr. Sanderson's testimony. (R., pp.229-30.) 
Of course, the defendant's own inculpatory statements can be used to 
corroborate accomplice testimony for purposes of the requirements of section 19-2117, 
Mitchell, 146 Idaho at 382-83, 195 P.3d at 741-42; however, Mr. Stone contends that 
none of the foregoing statements are actually inculpatory. First, statements about the 
general nature of the case (i.e., who the suspects were and what the case was about) in 
no way connects the defendant to the commission of the offenses where there has been 
widespread news coverage of the case, as was the case here.7 (Tr., p.251, Ls.16-18.) 
Second, merely being present in the city where a crime is allegedly committed does not 
connect the defendant to the commission of the offense. Third, the fact that the 
defendant changed his story about his whereabouts, while certainly impeaching of his 
credibility, does not connect him to the commission of the offense. Truly corroborating 
evidence might have consisted of independent testimony placing Mr. Stone behind the 
wheel of Mr. Bailey's car on July 1, 2006; however, such evidence, or even anything like 
' Although the district court seems to have assumed that the only media coverage of the 
case had occurred around the time of the commission of the alleged offenses, some five 
months prior to Mr. Stone's interrogation (R., pp.229-30), any factual finding to that 
effect would be clearly erroneous, as there is no evidence in the record to support such 
n findinn lCao Tr n 761 1 c 16-31 1 
it, was utterly lacking in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Stone's convictions cannot stand. 
I.C. 9 19-2117. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Stone respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
his convictions and acquit him of all charges. 
DATED this 2"d day of March, 2009. 
ERIK R. LEHTI~EN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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